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Given the evidence that board governance benefits investors, why
is there callfor increased shareholder control of corporations?
The Mythical
Benefits of
Shareh older Control
BY LYNN A. STOUT
UCLA Law School
na forthcoming Virginia Law Review article, Pro-
fessor Lucian Bebchuk argues that the notion that
shareholders in public corporations have the
power to remove directors is a myth. This is per-
haps an overstatement, but Bebchuk is correct to
suggest that in a public company with widely dis-
persed share ownership, it is difficult and expen-
sive for shareholders to overcome obstacles to collective
action and wage a proxy battle to oust an incumbent board.
Nor is success likely when directors can use corporate funds
to solicit proxies to stay in place. The end result, as Adolf
Berle and Gardiner Means famously observed in their 1932
book The Modern Corporation and Private Property, is that
shareholders in American public corporations are "sub-
servient" to directors "who can employ the proxy machinery
to become a self-perpetuating body."
So not only is shareholder control largely a myth in pub-
lic companies, it has been recognized to be largely a myth for
at least three-quarters of a century. What should we conclude
from this?
Bebchuk concludes that the time has come to breath life
into the idea of the shareholder-controlled public firm. But
there are many myths - vampires, zombies, giant alligators in
the sewers of New York City - that we would not want to make
real. Would greater shareholder power to oust directors be a
similar monster?
An extensive literature on the theory of the corporation
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suggests that shareholders enjoy net benefits from board gov-
ernance. Board governance, while worsening agency costs,
also promotes efficient and informed decisionmaking, dis-
courages inter-shareholder opportunism, and encourages
valuable specific investment in corporate team production.
Because board control has both costs and benefits, the wisdom
of Bebchuk's proposal to make it easier for shareholders to
oust directors must be based on evidence, and the empirical
evidence strongly supports the claim that shareholders them-
selves often prefer firms with strong board control.
Why, then, do so many observers believe shareholders
should be given greater influence over boards? Calls for greater
"shareholder democracy" have emotional appeal to laymen,
the business media, and even many business experts. The
emotional appeal of shareholder control can be traced to
three sources: a common but misleading metaphor that
describes shareholders as the "owners" of corporations; the
opportunistic calls of activist shareholders seeking leverage
over boards for self-interested reasons; and a strong but unfo-
cused sense that something (anything!) should be done in the
wake of recent corporate scandals. The result has been a wide-
spread, and unfortunate, acceptance ofyet another myth - the
myth that shareholder control of public corporations actual-
ly benefits shareholders.
THEORETICAL ADVANTAGES OF BOARDS
I do not attempt to contest the claim that shareholders in pub-
lic corporations have little power to remove directors. That
much is obvious to any informed observer. Instead, I ask why
shareholders in public companies have so little power.
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DECISIONMAKING Board governance benefits shareholders
by performing not one, but three, important economic func-
tions. Perhaps the most obvious is promoting more efficient
and informed business decisionmaking. It is difficult and
expensive to arrange for thousands of dispersed shareholders
to express their often-differing views on the best way to run
the firm. Nor, given the rational apathy most shareholders
bring to the table, should we expect shareholder governance
to produce particularly good results. Accordingly, most experts
agree that board governance offers important advantages in
terms of efficient and informed decisionmaking.
But if more efficient and informed decisionmaking were all
that director governance provided, it is hard to explain why
corporate law limits shareholder voting quite so severely. The
default rules of corporate law allow shareholders to vote only
to elect directors and to veto "fundamental" corporate changes
(e.g., mergers) that the directors must propose. Yet one can
imagine many important decisions - for example, whether the
CEO should be fired, or shareholders should be paid a special
dividend - about which shareholders could easily become
informed and efficiently register their views. And if board
governance provides only efficient and informed decision-
making, should we not at least make it easier (as Bebchuk pro-
poses) for shareholders to replace the board? Why does cor-
porate law not only strictly limit the matters on which share-
holders may vote, but make it difficult for them to exercise
their votes effectively to boot?
A second problem with emphasizing efficient and informed
decisionmaking as the primary reason for board governance
is that it may be a better explanation for executive governance.
After all, if we want decisions to be made by a small number
of highly informed individuals who are deeply involved in
the firm's day-to-day operations, what better way to accom-
plish this than by hiring (as virtually all large companies do)
a skilled executive team? Why can't shareholders then vote
directly to choose or remove the executives? Why add the
extra decisionmaking layer of a board - especially one whose
members are often not involved in the company and that
meets only a few times each year?
Better decisionmaking does a good job of explaining why
companies hire executive teams. It does not go nearly as far,
however, toward explaining why companies also have power-
ful boards. Nor does it explain directors' extreme lack of
"accountability" to shareholders (a lack that, as we shall see,
corporations often magnify through staggered board provi-
sions, dual-class structures, and the like). In addition to pro-
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moting better decisionmaking, board power likely offers share-
holders other important advantages.
INTER-SHAREHOLDER OPPORTUNISM Board power does
indeed serve shareholder interests in a second way - by pro-
tecting shareholders from each other. The risk that a large share-
holder might try to influence corporate decisions in a self-serv-
ing way that harms other shareholders is well-recognized in
closely held firms, where corporate law and practice have evolved
numerous strategies to constrain inter-shareholder oppor-
tunism. What is less well-understood is that, by making it easi-
er for large shareholders in public firms to threaten directors, a
more effective shareholder franchise might increase the risk of
inter-shareholder "rent-seeking" in public companies.
According to Iman Anabtawi, shareholders in public firms
have conflicts of interest that can give rise to opportunistic
behavior. An especially troubling situation involves the
investor who takes a position in a stock and uses his voting
power to push for business strategies that increase the value
of another security the investor also holds. Hedge fund Perry
Capital, for example, recently acquired a block of Mylan Lab-
oratories common stock while simultaneously entering a
derivatives contract with a brokerage firm that allowed Perry
to keep the Mylan votes while hedging away its economic
interest in the stock. Perry then used its position as a large
Mylan shareholder to pressure Mylan's board to acquire anoth-
er company, King Pharmaceuticals, at a hefty premium over
market price. Why would Perry want Mylan to overpay for
King? Because Perry also held a large block of King stock -
and had not hedged away its economic interest in King.
The case of Perry Capital illustrates the danger inherent in
changing the rules of corporate law in a way that gives oppor-
tunistic shareholders in public companies greater leverage over
boards. By the same token, corporate law rules that insulate
boards from shareholder pressures can discourage predatory
shareholder behavior. Board power serves the interests ofinvestors
who worry about director "shirking," but fear shareholder "shark-
ing" (opportunistic behavior by shareholders) even more.
TEAM PRODUCTION As we have just seen, shareholders can
be exploited not only by corporate officers and directors (the
usual suspects in "agency cost" discussions), but also by their
fellow shareholders. They face this risk because stock is, coun-
terintuitively, an illiquid investment. Although a single share-
holder may be able to sell a small number of shares easily, when
exploited shareholders try to sell en masse the result is a pre-
dictable loss of value.
The connection between illiquidity and vulnerability
explains why shareholders can be exploited. it also provides the
foundation for a third theory of director power on which I,
Margaret Blair, and others have written: the team production
theory. Team production analysis recognizes that sharehold-
ers are not the only group to make illiquid, "firm specific"
investments in corporations. Executives, customers, creditors,
suppliers, employees, and other corporate "stakeholders" also
put time, money, and expertise into relationships with com-
panies. These investments have value only if the company
survives and thrives and the relationship is preserved. A typ-
ical start-up, for example, needs an entrepreneur with an idea,
equity investors to fund initial operations, and executives to
provide skill and long hours implementing the idea. Each
contribution is essential, and each risks being lost if the firm
goes under or the investor is forced out of the corporate
"team" before the project succeeds.
Economists have long recognized that formal contracts can-
not fully protect specific investments in team production. As a
result, all "specific investors" - whether they be stockholders, exec-
utives, customers, or rank-and-file employees - are vulnerable to
the risk that someone given control over the corporation might
use that control to threaten the value of their investment or
exclude them from the corporate team. If shareholders con-
trolled public corporations, at least some might be tempted to
use shareholder control in an opportunistic fashion to "hold up"
other team members. This is because shareholders can profit from
threatening other stakeholders' interests. For example, they can
increase earnings by demanding that long-term employees accept
reduced health benefits or risk being fired, or by requiring cus-
tomers to purchase additional software in order to get continued
customer support. When specific investments are large enough,
the immediate financial returns from making such opportunis-
tic threats can easily outweigh any longer-term reputational costs.
Anticipating this, many important corporate stakeholders would
be justifiably reluctant to make specific investments in public
companies run by widely dispersed but powerful shareholders,
some ofwhom might be tempted to pump up share price by mak-
ing opportunistic threats.
Ofcourse, directors can make opportunistic threats, too. The
difference is that, unlike shareholders, directors do not benefit
financially from making threats, at least not in their positions as
directors. To the extent that directors have an interest in the cor-
porate entity, their interest is to keep the entity healthy so they
can keep their board positions. (Although it is often asserted with-
out support that corporate directors can use their powers in a self-
serving fashion to enrich themselves, this claim ignores the very
real constraints imposed by the duty ofloyalty.) Board governance
as a result attracts specific investors by offering what renowned
corporate lawyer Marty Lipton has described as the promise of
"business continuity." Stakeholders contemplating making spe-
cific investments in relationships with corporations put more
faith in firms run by boards than in firms run by powerful and
possibly opportunistic shareholders. The result is that board
power serves shareholders' collective ex ante interest in attracting
valuable specific investments even as it frustrates individual
shareholders' ex post attempts to increase "shareholder value" at
other stakeholders' expense.
SUMMING UP Since the public corporation first emerged in
the nineteenth century, it has proven to have enduring appeal
for large, uncertain, long-term business projects, including rail-
roads, canals, automobile and aerospace manufacturing, phar-
maceuticals, software, and brand-name consumer products.
An important part of this appeal lies in the advantages of
board control. Incorporation allows thousands or even hun-
dreds of thousands of diverse corporate participants - share-
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holders, employees, executives, suppliers, customers, and
sometimes even the local community - to make illiquid com-
mitments to large, uncertain, long-lived projects, safe in the
knowledge that control over the project rests in the hands of
a small and informed group of individuals who have a mod-
est personal interest in ensuring the company's success and
(perhaps more important) no strong financial interest in try-
ing to expropriate wealth from other participants.
Of course, board power has disadvantages as well. To the
extent that directors are "unaccountable" to either share-
holders or other stakeholders, they may not always do the best
possible job of running the firm. Directors have an enforce-
able fiduciary duty of loyalty that discourages outright theft.
However, for a variety of reasons, the duty of care (famously
hamstrung by the business judgment rule) is far less effective
at preventing director shirking. As a result, board governance
inevitably creates a risk that directors will manage corpora-
tions in a fashion that is adequate, but not optimal.
Board power accordingly has benefits but also some costs.
This makes it impossible to assume, based on armchair the-
orizing alone, that shareholders would benefit from stronger
voting rights. Before changing longstanding rules of corpo-
rate law to give shareholders greater leverage over boards, as
Professor Bebchuk suggests, lawmakers should demand com-
pelling evidence that the benefits of changing the rules out-
weigh the costs.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The compelling evidence necessary to support Bebchuk's
proposal is, however, notably missing. Bebchuk cites five
empirical studies of proxy contests in support of his propos-
al. At least two of the five cut against Bebchuk's thesis, find-
ing negative abnormal returns from proxy contests when dis-
senting shareholders succeed in gaining board seats. Another
two undermine his proposal more indirectly, finding that
proxy contests increase shareholder "value" primarily when
they trigger a firm's liquidation or sale. (An extensive litera-
ture, which Bebchuk does not discuss, addresses why putting
a firm up for sale often raises share price for reasons unrelat-
ed to improved performance, including bidder overpayment,
inefficient market discounting, downward-sloping demand,
and shareholder wealth extraction from other stakeholders.)
This weak and mixed evidence on the benefits of proxy
contests mirrors a broader pattern in empirical studies of cor-
porate law. Although dozens of papers have tried to find rela-
tionships between particular governance practices and corpo-
rate performance, most fail to find any strong connection,
and the few studies that do (including at least one study cited
by Bebchuk) often are not supported by other researchers.
What explains this pattern? Why is it so hard to prove that par-
ticular governance measures improve corporate performance?
Part of the problem may lie in academics' tendency to equate "cor-
porate performance" with short-term share price performance,
a dubious metric at best. Gauging corporate performance by
measuring share price changes over weeks or months is a bit like
picking your accountant by measuring his or her height. It is easy
to do, but unlikely to ensure a good outcome.
STRONG EVIDENCE FOR BOARDS Theremaybeamorefun-
damental reason, however, why the business world has stub-
bornly refused to give hungry academics the evidence they
crave about how they can improve corporate performance
through one or another governance "reform." In brief, business
firms enjoy a wide range of choice over the governance rules
they adopt and work under. Sensibly enough, they choose the
rules that work best for their particular business (and, in the
process, for their investors). This means that we should not
expect to see a strong connection between any particular gov-
ernance structure and corporate performance, because differ-
ent structures work well for different firms. In other words, cor-
porate law is endogenous.
To understand this idea, let us start with an often-over-
looked fact ofbusiness life: investors are not forced at gunpoint
to purchase shares in public corporations. They can invest
instead in proprietorships, partnerships, limited partnerships,
and closely held companies. And when investors do buy shares
in public companies, they can choose which firms' shares
they buy.
This last point is important because American corporations
can choose which state's laws they will incorporate under. Even
more significant, they can choose to modify those laws
through customized charter provisions, including charter
provisions that strengthen or weaken shareholders' voting
rights. Bebchuk's proposal does nothing for shareholders
that corporate law does not already allow them to do for
themselves. If investors truly believed greater shareholder con-
trol meant better corporate performance, they could "vote
with their wallets" by preferring shares in firms that give
shareholders more control.
If investors often did this, it would be evidence that share-
holder control serves shareholder interests, at least in those
firms. Yet studies indicate that equity investors generally do not
prefer companies that give them stronger rights. This can be
seen most clearly in the context of initial public offerings
(IPOs). Companies "going public" have every incentive to adopt
governance structures that appeal to outside investors (gener-
ally sophisticated mutual and pension funds). If greater share-
holder control meant better shareholder returns, IPO compa-
nies could raise more money by offering shareholders more
control. Yet studies find that when IPO firms use customized
charter provisions to modify shareholder voting rights, they
generally use them to move in the direction opposite of that
recommended by Bebchuk, weakening shareholder rights.
For exampleJohn Coates has showed that, during the 19 90s,
between 34 percent and 82 percent ofIPO charters included stag-
gered board provisions that made it harder for shareholders to
remove directors. An even more dramatic example of this trend
can be seen in the recent Google IPO. Google went public with
a dual-class charter that left outside investors largely powerless.
Far from shunning Google's IPO, investors oversubscribed it. In
the language of economics, investors "revealed" a preference for
a firm in which they themselves had almost no power.
Are investors stupid? Why do they not avoid IPos with
weak shareholder rights? Is it possible that shareholders, like
Ulysses, sometimes see advantage in "tying their own hands"
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and ceding control over the corporation to directors largely
insulated from their own influence?
Reformers calling for greater "shareholder democracy"
rarely ask such questions. Yet investors' long-standing will-
ingness to buy shares in companies controlled by "unac-
countable" boards provides compelling empirical evidence
that investors themselves often prefer weak shareholder rights.
This raises the question: why do so many observers still sup-
port the kind of top-down, one-size-fits-all governance
"reform" recommended by Bebchuk, when there is so little evi-
dence that shareholders - or anyone else - would benefit?
EMOTIONAL APPEAL
The myth of the shareholder franchise rests on a larger, deep-
er myth: the myth that public corporations are run well when
they are run according to shareholders' wishes. This larger
myth of the benefits of shareholder control has captured
hearts and minds not because it is based on evidence, but
because it has a tremendous emotional appeal. This emo-
tional appeal can be traced to three sources.
SHAREHOLDER 'OWNERSHIP' The first source is the popu-
lar but misleading metaphor that describes shareholders as
"owners" of corporations. As a legal matter, the claim that
shareholders "own" the corporation is obviously incorrect.
Corporations are independent legal entities that own them-
selves; shareholders own only a security, called "stock," with
very limited legal rights. Nevertheless, the ownership
metaphor exerts a powerful, if often subconscious, influence
on the way many people think about corporate governance.
After all, if shareholders "own" corporations, should they not
also control them?
Sophisticated observers generally avoid the trap of "own-
ership" talk. Instead, they fall prey to two other mistaken
ideas. The first is the casual assumption, prevalent in the
economic literature on "agency costs," that shareholders are
the "principals" in public corporations and that directors
are shareholders' "agents." But as corporate law experts
have pointed out, the agency metaphor misstates the real
legal status of shareholders and directors. At law, a princi-
pal has a right to control her agent. Directors are not agents
but fiduciaries largely insulated from shareholders' con-
trol, and they owe duties not just to shareholders but also
to the firm as a whole.
The other mistaken idea that often influences experts is the
claim that shareholders are the "sole residual claimants" in cor-
porations. Again, as a factual matter, this is patently incorrect.
In a public company, the board of directors controls both div-
idend payouts and corporate expenses (meaning the board
controls whether the corporation's books show any "earn-
ings"). This means that shareholders are unlikely to receive,
and certainly are not legally entitled to receive, every penny of
revenue received by the corporation that is not obligated to be
paid out on some formal contract. Rather, while sharehold-
ers may share in the wealth when the corporation does well
and suffer when the firm does poorly, so may employees, cred-
itors, and other stakeholders. Director discretion means that
many different groups are potential residual claimants and
residual risk-bearers in public firms.
Thus, none of the three phrases commonly used to describe
shareholders' relationship to the public corporation -
whether as "owners," "principals," or "sole residual claimants"
- is factually correct. Nevertheless, all three give the idea of
greater shareholder control an emotional appeal that ignores
the realities of business law and practice.
SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY? A second reason why many
people may find the idea that shareholder control necessari-
ly benefits shareholders to be appealing may be that particu-
lar shareholders at particular firms sometimes say they want
more control. Activist hedge funds, in particular, often anoint
themselves champions of "shareholder value" who ought to
be allowed to control the board's actions.
As discussed earlier, however, a major advantage of board
control is that, by requiring shareholders and stakeholders
alike to give up much of their power over the corporation ex
ante, board governance protects shareholders' and other stake-
holders' illiquid specific investments in corporations from
attempts by large shareholders to extract wealth by threaten-
ing those investments ex post. For this reason, ex post share-
holder demands for greater control should be viewed with a
jaundiced eye for what they often are: opportunistic attempts
to increase "shareholder value" by changing the corporate
rules in the middle of the game.
Ifwe really want to gauge shareholders' true preferences, the
best way to do this is not to listen to what some shareholders say
but instead to look at what shareholders collectively do at the
investment stage, when they must "put their money where their
mouths are." As we have already seen, at the investment stage,
shareholders seem perfectly happy to buy shares in companies
controlled by boards (or, at least, unwilling to pay the price of
keeping control themselves). This observation highlights the
danger of giving too much credence to shareholders' after-the-
fact calls for greater control. Like Ulysses, shareholders chose to
bind themselves to boards ex ante for good reasons.
'ENRON EFFECT' Finally, let us turn to the third and perhaps
most powerful source of the emotional appeal of shareholder
governance. This is the sense of imminent crisis that has been
sparked by recent large-scale corporate frauds and failures at
Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, Adelphia, Healthsouth, etc. Faced with
what seem obvious cases of executive malfeasance and director
negligence (as well as the lesser outrage of apparently runaway
executive pay at firms like Disney and General Electric), many
observers have concluded that something mustbe done. When this
sense of crisis is combined with misleading descriptions of
shareholders as "owners," "principals," or "sole residual
claimants" (not to mention activist shareholders' ex post calls for
greater leverage), it is easy to jump to the conclusion that the
"something" that "must be done" is to give shareholders in pub-
lic firms a louder voice and a stronger hand.
This response - we might call it the "Enron effect" - fails
to appreciate both the causes of corporate fraud and the les-
sons of business history. Enron did not collapse because its
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shareholders did not have enough power. In fact, to outside
observers, the firm seemed to be a model of "good corporate
governance," with a large majority of supposedly independent
directors, an independent audit committee, no staggered
board provision, and stock option compensation to tie both
director and executive pay to performance. More generally,
Enron's collapse - and other scandals at other firms -
occurred at a time in history when shareholders enjoyed more
influence over boards than ever before.
In the earlier times, shareholders in public companies were
far more powerless and more handicapped by collective action
problems than they are today. Most were private individuals
with very small stakes, no ready means of communicating with
each other, and no access to corporate funds or the corporate
ballot. Today, shareholders have much greater ability to act in
concert and to influence boards as a result of a variety of
developments that include the increasing clout of institu-
tional investors like pension funds and mutual funds; the
rise of "activist" investment funds; the creation of sharehold-
er advisory services like Institutional Shareholder Services; the
development of new information technologies that make
inter-shareholder communication quicker, cheaper, and eas-
ier; and the Securities and Exchange Commission's adoption
of rules designed to give shareholders greater voice.
These developments make the suggestion that we can avoid
future Enrons by giving shareholders in public firms more
control seem a bizarre non sequitur. Greater shareholder
power in the 1970s and 1980s did not prevent corporate scan-
dals in the 1990s. If the medicine did not work the first time,
why should taking more work now?
CONCLUSION
In fact, the medicine may hurt. Lack of shareholder power did
not contribute to Enron's fall. One thing that did contribute,
however - and contributed to problems at many other firms
as well - was Enron's willing embrace of the favorite gover-
nance "reform" fad of the 1990s: stock options. Just as share-
holder power is hailed as the obvious solution to corporate
America's problems today, stock options were hailed as the
ideal way to ensure "good corporate governance" a decade ago.
Congress found this notion so compelling that, in 1993, it pro-
hibited corporations from deducting as a business expense any
executive compensation in excess of $1 million unless the
compensation were somehow tied to "performance." The
result was an explosion in the use of stock options that has
since been linked to similar explosions in executive pay, earn-
ings "restatements," and large-scale frauds.
The case of stock options offers a cautionary tale on the
unintended consequences of top-down corporate governance
"reforms" that are not based on compelling evidence. By
adopting a solution without fully understanding the problem,
Congress likely did far more harm than good.
Bebchuk's proposal presents the same danger. For genera-
tions, American investors have voluntarily ceded control over
their investments in public companies to boards of directors
largely insulated from their own influence. Economic theory
teaches that investors do this because board control serves
their self-interest in at least three ways: by promoting efficient
and informed decisionmaking; by discouraging inter-share-
holder opportunism; and by encouraging specific investment
in corporations by executives, employees, customers, creditors,
and other corporate stakeholders. Business history and prac-
tice support this view. Given this background, we should
demand strong empirical evidence indeed before concluding
that giving shareholders greater control over corporate direc-
tors would be a good idea.
That evidence is missing. Rather than being driven by data,
calls for greater shareholder control over public corporations
seem driven by sentiment and the unspoken assumption that
shareholder democracy, like Mom and apple pie, must be
good a thing. In other words, the proposal laid out by Pro-
fessor Bebchuk in his forthcoming Virginia Law Review article
itself rests on a myth: the myth that greater shareholder con-
trol in public firms benefits shareholders. Unless and until we
can make this fable a reality, a strong shareholder franchise
should also remain a fiction. 13
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